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Abstract 
We examine the effect of one of the presumably most powerful cartels ever on the profitability 
of its members. More precisely, we consider the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, a coal 
cartel that operated in Imperial Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century, using a newly 
constructed dataset and two different methodological approaches. At first, we employ event 
study methodology to asses the reaction of the stock market to the foundation of the cartel and 
two major revisions of its original contract. Furthermore, we look at different performance 
measures calculated from accounting and financial data in a dynamic panel data framework. 
Overall, our results suggest that the investigated cartel had no significant effect on the profitabil-
ity of its members. However, we also find that it was able to stabilise coal prices and powerful 
enough to ensure that on average, prices were set high enough to avert negative repercussions on 
company performance. 
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1.   Introduction 
The effect of cartels and other collusive arrangements on the profitability of the participating 
companies is a widely disputed topic in empirical industrial organisation. One group of studies 
relies on cross-sectional investigations covering many industries and collusive arrangements. 
The results of these investigations are mixed. Asch/Seneca (1976, from whom we adapted the 
title of our paper) find that, in the U.S. manufacturing industry, collusion had a negative effect 
on company performance measured by the Return on Equity (RoE). In contrast, based on esti-
mated price-average cost margins of 54 international cartels, Griffin (1989) concludes that at 
least some of the investigated organisations must have increased the profits of their members 
significantly. Another group of empirical studies focuses on one specific case of collusive con-
duct and uses game-theoretical models. Similar to the cross-sectional investigations, the results 
of these studies vary considerably. Levenstein (1997) finds that profits in the cartelised Bromine 
industry were at least temporarily close to the joint profit-maximising level. Röller/Steen (2006) 
show that cartelisation in the Norwegian cement industry resulted in profits far below the joint-
profit maximising but above the non-cooperative Cournot level. In his seminal work on the Joint 
Executive Committee, Porter (1983) concludes that the profitability of the companies participat-
ing in the cartel did not exceed the non-cooperative Cournot level. In this study, we follow an 
approach that is distinct from both of the procedures mentioned above.
1 In line with investiga-
tions by Bittner (2005) and Marin/Sicotte (2003), we make use of the information content of 
stock market data and event study methodology to assess the effects of collusive conduct on 
company performance. In addition, we augment these results by a combined analysis of finan-
cial, accounting, and output data in a dynamic panel data framework. 
The subject of our investigation is the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate (Rheinisch-
Westfälisches Kohlensyndikat, RWKS), a coal cartel that operated in Imperial Germany’s most 
important industrial region, the Ruhr district. Our investigation period ranges from the founda-
tion of the cartel in 1893 up to the First World War. We believe that the RWKS is especially 
well-suited to asses the effects of cartelisation for at least two reasons. First, unlike today and in 
other countries at that time (e.g., the United States) collusion was legal in Imperial Germany. 
After a groundbreaking decision by the German Imperial High Court (Reichsgericht) in 1897, 
cartel contracts were even legally enforceable in the courts (see Böhm, 1948). As a result, the 
information problem that researchers of modern tacit collusion struggle with is absent in our 
study. In particular, we have detailed information on cartel duration, membership in the cartel, 
market shares, cartel contracts, and the negotiation processes that preceded these contracts. Sec-
ond, the RWKS is one of the longest-lasting cartels ever (Levenstein/Suslow, 2006) and believed 
to be one of the most powerful of the numerous collusive arrangements that operated in Imperial 
Germany (see, e.g., Hentschel, 1978). Thus, it should be a prominent candidate for a cartel that 
                                        
1   Another approach oftentimes used to determine the effects of collusion on prices and profits is the examina-
tion of antitrust prosecutions. See, e.g., Sproul’s (1993) cross-sectional study on 25 antitrust cases in the 
1970s and early 1980s, and Block/Nold/Sidaks’ (1981) investigation of the effects of antitrust enforcement in 
the U.S. bread industry. Bosch/Eckard (1991) use event study methodology to assess whether antitrust in-
dictments lowered investors’ expectations of future profits. 3 
affected its members’ profitability. To put it differently: If the RWKS had no effect, which other 
cartel would? This question is related to a broader interpretation of Imperial Germany’s economy 
history, namely that the rise of the country from a backwarded rural economy to one of the most 
dynamic industrialised nations in the world was linked to the existence of a peculiar German 
business model labelled ‘organised capitalism’ (Kocka, 1974; Parnell, 1994) or ‘cooperative 
capitalism’ (Chandler, 1990) and characterised by large joint-stock credit banks, tariffs, and – 
last but not least – a comparatively high level of cooperation among companies.
2 
The existing studies on the RWKS differ in their assessment of the cartel’s effect on the profit-
ability of its members. In line with the findings of contemporary scholars (Bock, 1914; Lüters, 
1928), Blaich (1973) and Burke (1979) argue for a positive effect.
3 In contrast, Bittner (2005), 
Peters (1989), and Pounds/Parker (1957) regard the cartel as being rather ineffective and thus, 
not being able to affect performance in any way. Almost all of the studies mentioned above suf-
fer from a common shortcoming: They do not offer compelling quantitative evidence to back 
their assertions. The only exception is Bittner’s study. As we do in our investigation, Bittner uses 
stock market data and event study methodology. He finds that the formation of the cartel in 1893 
resulted in very small positive performance effects for some cartel members, while others did not 
gain at all. As a result, Bittner comes to the conclusion that the RWKS had almost no effect on 
the performance of its members. However, his study has two major weaknesses. First, his sample 
is extremely small, as he investigates only six companies. Second, he does not account for the 
development of the RWKS in the years after 1893, because of his exclusive focus on the founda-
tion of the organisation. In our study, we overcome these two shortcomings by looking at a sam-
ple of up to 19 companies and by investigating not only the foundation of the RWKS, but also 
two major revisions of the original cartel contract. Furthermore, we add another long-term per-
spective by examining the development of financial, accounting, and output figures over a time 
span of 33 years. 
The results of our investigation are the following: In line with the results of Bittner, the findings 
from our event studies indicate that contemporary investors believed that the profitability of car-
tel members would be almost unaffected by the foundation of the RWKS. For the first revision 
of the original cartel contract this neutral assessment persisted. In contrast, in the event study of 
the second revision of the original contract, we detect a small but positive performance effect. 
The results from the combined analysis of accounting, financial, and output figures show neither 
a positive nor a negative effect of cartelisation on company performance, measured by the Re-
turn on Assets (RoA) or Tobin’s q. 
                                        
2   Apart from cartelisation, interlocking directorates and tight bank-company relations are identified as coordi-
nation mechanisms (for a review of the literature, see Fohlin, 2007). 
3   A widely cited study on cartelisation in Imperial Germany by Webb (1980) is not relevant in this context. 
Webb focuses on the Steel Works Association and concludes that in combination with tariffs on iron and 
steel products this cartel reduced the sales risk of its members. As a result, they were more willing to engage 
in capital intensive vertical integration, which positively affected efficiency and thus also profitability. How-
ever, tariffs play a crucial role in the Webb model and there were none on coal. 4 
Our study is organised in six parts. In the next section, we outline the theoretical foundations of 
our investigation. Afterwards, we introduce the institutional setting of the RWKS, discuss its 
aims, and present some stylised facts on market structure and the efficacy of the cartel with re-
gard to price stabilisation. Furthermore, as a basis of the event study we give a detailed chrono-
logical account of cartel development in the years under consideration. In the next two sections, 
we present our research design and data. Then, we discuss our empirical findings. The last sec-
tion concludes. 
2.   Theoretical Discussion 
The theoretical predictions regarding the performance effect of cartelisation are ambiguous. In 
the most basic economic model cartels are equated with monopolies: They enable the participat-
ing companies to extract monopoly rents by reducing output and raising prices above marginal 
costs. However, in the same basic model it can be shown that cartel members have strong incen-
tives to cheat by chiselling the cartel price once a cooperative arrangement has been agreed on, 
because as long as all other cartel members adhere to the agreement, such behaviour will in-
crease their individual profits.
4 Then again, this non-cooperative strategy is strictly preferable 
only in one-period games. In settings with repeated interactions, a potential defector has to 
weight the short-term gains of cheating against the long-term losses of cartel breakdown: If the 
defection in the first period is detected, it will trigger a punishment phase in all following peri-
ods, where the other cartel members will also resort to the non-cooperative strategy (Friedman, 
1971).
5 
Economic theory also provides a rich set of factors that might hamper the achievement and/or the 
maintenance of successful collusive conduct. Dynamic demand conditions, for example, make 
the detection of cheating more difficult, as, for the cartel members, it is harder to discriminate 
whether changes in their sales that are due to non-cooperative behaviour by another cartel mem-
ber or due to changes in overall demand (Green/Porter, 1984; Rottemberg/Saloner, 1986). Fur-
thermore, a large number of cartel members, heterogeneity of cost functions, and low barriers to 
entry can make collusion more difficult to achieve and sustain (Stigler, 1964, 1966): the first two 
factors, because they increases negotiation and monitoring costs; low barriers to entry, because 
they make the emergence of cartel outsiders more likely. 
Finally, there are factors that can be both supportive or hindering to successful collusive conduct. 
Product heterogeneity, for example, reduces the profitability of cheating, as attracting customers 
from other cartel members by chiselling the cartel price becomes more difficult, but at the same 
time, the detection of cheating becomes more difficult as well and the punishment phases will be 
less severe (Deneckere, 1983). Excess capacities can also both support or hamper collusive con-
                                        
4   The basic cartel-monopoly model and the static cartel instability problem are described in every industrial 
economics textbook (see, e.g., Martin, 1994; Scherer/Ross, 1990). 
5   In multi-period games, the profitability of cheating depends critically on the size of the discount factor a po-
tential defector attaches to future profits. 5 
duct (Davidson/Deneckere, 1990). On the one hand, holding excess capacities comes at a cost 
and thus, prevents colluding companies from jointly maximising their profits, but on the other 
hand, they increase their ability to punish defectors an thereby, can help to stabilise collusive 
arrangements. 
In the following part, we will see that – according to official statements of the RWKS – price 
stabilisation was among the first and foremost aims of the organisation. The theoretical literature 
on price stabilisation cartels predicts that mean preserving price stabilisation (i.e., reducing the 
variability of prices over the business cycle without changing the mean of the price levels in 
boom and slump periods) will reduce the profitability of the participating companies (Oi, 1961).
6 
Moreover, in order to implement such a price scheme, the cartel will have to enforce restrictions 
on the output of its members in boom periods, and in slump periods some form of non-price de-
mand rationing will have to be applied. The negative performance effect can be offset if the car-
tel runs a buffer stock. In this case, enforced restrictions of production and non-price rationing 
will no longer be necessary, because total output over the business cycle is the same as with 
competition. However, for our study the idea of a buffer stock is unrealistic, as in the time period 
under investigation due to outgassing and the danger of spontaneous ignition larger amounts of 
coal could not be stored for extended periods of time (Orth, 1922).
7 The profitability of price 
stabilisation schemes will certainly change, if the cartel uses its market power to raise the mean 
price level above the mean level of competitive boom and slump periods (Scherer/Ross, 1990). If 
this increase is large enough to offset the negative repercussions of stabilised prices, cartel mem-
bers will very likely be better off.
8 
Based on the theoretical considerations mentioned above, we construct four scenarios that will 
guide the following analysis of the RWKS: (1) If we observe a significant stabilisation of coal 
prices and a decrease in profitability after the formation of the RWKS, we can conclude that the 
                                        
6   The model assumes that there are only two states of the economy – boom and slump – that occur with the 
same probability (0.5) and are characterised by equal-sized positive and negative shifts in demand. Empirical 
investigations on the business cycle in Imperial Germany show that there were more boom than slump years 
(Burhop/Wolff, 2005). Adjusting the model to these more realistic parameters would further aggravate the 
negative performance effect of mean preserving price stabilisation schemes. 
7  Whenever we refer to coal, we will be talking about bituminous coal only. Thus, lignite coal is omitted from 
the investigation. This restriction is due to the fact that the markets for the two types of coal were even fur-
ther separated in the 19th and early 20th century than they are today. Because of its chemical constitution 
lignite coal could not be used in most of the industrial applications that made up much of the demand for bi-
tuminous coal (e.g., coke for blast furnaces). In addition, the major deposits for bituminous and lignite coal 
were situated in different geographical areas. As a result, there was no direct contact between companies that 
mined bituminous and those that mined lignite coal. In our investigation period, not one company situated in 
the Ruhr district mined both types of coal and there was not one single takeover that involved a bituminous 
as well as a lignite coal mine. 
8   Apart from its mixed implications for their profitability, price stabilisation schemes also affect the cartel 
members’ price and profit risk. Simple mean preserving price stabilisation reduces the variability of both 
prices and profits. Given companies are risk-averse they should be willing to sacrifice some profitability for 
these reductions. However, so far it is far from clear that the positive effects of smaller risk are large enough 
to offset the negative repercussions of smaller profits, so that in the end, the cartel members would be better 
off. Theoretical considerations are only available for the buffer stock case. Moreover, these are also inconclu-
sive. On the one hand, using a slightly modified version of the basic model, Newberry/Stiglitz (1981) show 
that even risk-averse producers will not gain. On the other hand, in a state-preference framework Cham-
bers/Quiggin (2003) predict that such schemes always make risk-averse producers better off. 6 
cartel stabilised prices, but was not able (or willing) to raise them above the mean preserving 
level. (2) If we observe a significant stabilisation of coal prices and stable or increasing profit-
ability after the formation of the RWKS, we can infer that the cartel stabilised prices above the 
mean preserving level and, thus, produced monopoly rents for its members. (3) If we observe no 
significant stabilisation of coal prices and an increase in profitability after the formation of the 
RWKS, we can conclude that – in contrast to its official statements – the cartel actually raised 
prices above the competitive level and did not to stabilise them. (4) If we observe no significant 
stabilisation of coal prices and no increase or even decrease in profitability after the formation of 
the RWKS, we can conclude that the cartel was unsuccessful and inefficient. In order to test the 
plausibility of these four scenarios, we will explicitly and empirically approach two research 
questions: Did the investigated cartel stabilise price? and: Did it raise the profits of its members? 
3.   The Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate 
As mentioned before, the RWKS is widely regarded as one of the most powerful cartels that op-
erated in Imperial Germany. From its foundation in 1893, it lasted for more than 50 years until it 
was finally broken up by the Allies after the Second World War. Between 1893 and 1913, the 
combined output of its members represented about 50 per cent of the national output in bitumi-
nous coal. In the Ruhr district the market share was even more impressive. Here, the RWKS con-
trolled between 80 and 90 percent of the output (Peters, 1989). 
The RWKS was both a price- and a quota-setting cartel.
9 In addition, it also managed the sales of 
its members. The participating companies were obliged to deliver their output to the organisa-
tion, which then sold it on the market and redistributed the revenues. The prices the cartel 
charged its costumers varied with the destination of sales. In non-competitive regions, where the 
members of the organisation enjoyed advantages in transportation costs that prevented outsiders 
from competing, prices were set annually.
10 Variations were only allowed to account for differ-
ences in quality. In areas with competition from cartel outsiders, the RWKS sold the coal at mar-
ket prices and compensated its members for the difference between the market and the cartel 
price. 
                                        
9   All statements on the institutional setting of the RWKS rely on the cartel contracts reproduced in Verein 
(1904b). 
10   In Kontradiktorische Verhandlungen (1903: 70), Anton Unckell, the head of the executive board of the 
RWKS, defined the non-competitive area as follows: “The non-competitive area stretches to the north as far 
as Holland, East Frisia and the Hamburg district; to the east, as far as the province of Saxony in part or, more 
precisely, the Elbe river; to the south, as far as the point where we clash in competition with Bohemia; and to 
the west, as far as Belgium and France. [The] competition from Saar coal [...] is not [...] as palpable for us to 
have to draw the border of the non-competitive area before reaching the Saar area.” Original: “Das unbestrit-
tene Gebiet wird begrenzt im Norden durch Holland, Ostfriesland und den Hamburger Bezirk, im Osten teil-
weise durch die Provinz Sachsen, oder richtiger durch die Elbe, im Süden, da wo wir mit der Konkurrenz von 
Böhmen zusammentreffen, und im Westen durch Belgien und Frankreich. [Die] Konkurrenz der Saarkohlen 
[...] macht sich [...] nicht so fühlbar für uns, daß wir die Grenze des unbestrittenen Gebiets schon vor Errei-
chung des Saarbezirkes hätten ziehen müssen.” 7 
Output was controlled by a dynamic quota system that allowed changes in the relative output 
shares of cartel members. The original quotas were assigned on the basis of their production in 
either 1891 or 1892 and expressed in absolute numbers (metric tons). The sum of these individ-
ual quotas was equal to the maximum total output of the cartel. In order to match supply and de-
mand, the cartel authorities were allowed to impose an equal percentage reduction to each mem-
ber’s quota. Non-compliance with the rules of the organisation – e.g., failures in meeting the de-
livery requirements or production in excess of one’s cartel quota – was sanctioned by severe 
fines. The overhead costs of the organisation as well as the compensations for sales in competi-
tive areas were financed by a variable percentage deduction from the revenues that the RWKS 
redistributed to its members. 
According to the official statements of the RWKS, the first and foremost aim of the organisation 
was the stabilisation of coal prices at a “reasonable” (angemessen) but “moderate” (gemäßigt) 
level.
11 Furthermore, it was also intended to raise and stabilise profits and to reduce the variabil-
ity of output. Although these three aims were interconnected, the decisions of the cartel authori-
ties did not necessarily mirror this (Peters, 1981). If conflicts between price and output policy 
arose, the former would usually be favoured over the latter. All in all, the output and profit aims 
were regarded as corollaries of successful price stabilisation.
12 
Notwithstanding the impressive market shares and the tight organisation of the RWKS, the mar-
ket structure of the coal mining industry in the Ruhr district displayed features that might have 
hampered a successful conduct by the cartel. First, the organisation had to deal with competition 
by outsiders. In total, only around 50 per cent of the coal output of its members was sold at cartel 
prices within the non-competitive regions (Wiedenfeld, 1912). For the remaining share of output, 
the RWKS had to compete with other coal producers in Germany and with imports from Great 
Britain (Walker, 1904). Furthermore, even within the non-competitive areas, the output of cartel 
outsiders became more and more substantial (see below). Second, there were many features that 
presumably increased negotiation and monitoring costs. First of all, the number of companies 
participating in the cartel was large.
13 Furthermore, there were remarkable differences in size
14 as 
well as substantial variations in cost situations
15. Finally, demand and supply conditions were 
                                        
11   The statements about the aims of the RWKS are based on the annual reports of the organisation (cited in 
Passow, 1911) and statements of cartel executives in Kontradiktorische Verhandlungen (1903). 
12   The argumentation of the cartel authorities is in line with the reasoning of contemporary German economists. 
See, e.g., Liefmann (1897); Schmoller (1923). 
13   At its foundation in 1893, the RWKS had no less than 98 members. In 1912, there still were 70 cartel mem-
bers (Peters, 1989). 
14   For example, in 1893, the minimum coal output of a cartel member was 13,944 metric tons. In contrast, the 
maximum was 2,926,729 tons. The median of the output of all 98 cartel members was 188,001 tons (calcu-
lated from figures in Jahrbuch, 1894). 
15   Most of the cost differences were due to geology. Mines in the southern part of the Ruhr district were faced 
with thinner and less evenly stratified coal seams than those that operated in the northern part. In addition, 
their output showed a less favourable ratio of coal to stone. In part, these cost disadvantages were set off by 
the fact that the overburden in the north was thicker and production shafts had to reach deeper in order to ac-
cess coal deposits (Bergmann, 1937; Brown, 1993: 203-229). 8 
dynamic.
16 Third, the design of the first and second cartel contract promoted the creation of ex-
cess capacities (see below). 
In order to evaluate the plausibility of the scenarios derived from the theoretical reasoning in 
section 2, at first we have to analyse if the RWKS was able to stabilise coal prices. Therefore, we 
consider two price series: one that displays prices charged in the non-competitive region and one 
that represents the overall sales price of coal from the Ruhr district (i.e., sales in the competitive 
as well as in the non-competitive region
17). For both series, we test whether their variability de-
clined after the formation of the cartel. Furthermore, we apply the same test to the variability of 
the Net National Product (NNP) deflator in order to distinguish cartel-related effects from econ-
omy-wide developments. The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Price Stabilisation (Variance of Annual Percentage Changes of Coal Prices  
and the NNP Deflator, 1876–1892 and 1893–1913) 
 
 Coal  price 
(non-competitive  
region) 




1876–1892  18.217 14.440  2.290 
1893–1913  5.793 5.108 2.451 
F-test (p-value)  0.000 0.006 0.763 
Note: coal price = price of fat coal at the exchange in Essen; overall sales price = total value of coal sales 
from the Ruhr district divided by sales in metric tons; F-test = F-test of variance equality; the F-statistic is 
given by F = sL
2 ./ sS
2  (where sL
2  is the variance in the subgroup with the larger and sS
2  is the variance in 
the subgroup with the smaller variance) and has NL-1 numerator and NS-1 denominator degrees of free-
dom (where NL is the number observations in the subgroup with the larger variance and NS is the number 
of observations in the subgroup with the smaller variance) 
Source: Banken (2003), Data-CD-ROM; Hoffmann (1965). 
 
The tests suggest that for both the coal price in the competitive region and the overall sales price, 
the variance of the annual changes was significantly lower after the formation of the RWKS. In 
contrast, the variability of changes in the NNP deflator remained almost the same. Thus, there is 
compelling evidence that the cartel was willing and able to stabilise coal prices, and we can re-
ject scenarios (3) (monopolistic pricing without price stabilisation) and (4) (complete inefficacy 
of the RWKS) outlined in section 2.
18 
                                        
16   Between 1880 and 1913, German coal output increased by more than 6 percent annually (Jahrbuch, various 
issues). During the same period, the output of the German iron and steel industry – with a 40 percent share by 
far the largest consumer of coal from the Ruhr district (Passow, 1911) – grew by almost 6 percent per year 
(Hoffmann, 1965). 
17  About 50 percent of the coal output from the Ruhr district was sold in the non-competitive region. The re-
maining part was sold in the competitive region (Wiedenfeld, 1912). 
18   It should be noted that the RWKS was far less effective in controlling output. Comparing the production 
targets of the organisation to the actual total output of its members, Peters (1981) comes to the conclusion 
that the RWKS failed to meet these targets in 19 out of 20 years between 1895 and 1914 (in nine years actual 
output was below, in ten years above desired output). 9 
The Foundation of the RWKS 
The foundation of the RWKS in 1893 was preceded by more than 20 years of failed attempts to 
coordinate the behaviour of the mining companies in the Ruhr district. From the late 1870s on-
wards, numerous less ambitious collusive arrangements had been put in place. However, all of 
these arrangements were short-lived and eventually failed because they were confined to small 
geographical areas, limited in the scope of their control, and lacking effective mechanisms to 
sanction non-cooperative behaviour.
19 As a result, before the foundation of the RWKS the min-
ing industry in the Ruhr district can be considered as a competitive industry (Holtfrerich, 1973). 
Given the unfavourable pre-history, the negotiation process that finally led to the foundation of 
the RWKS was complicated and enduring. In January 1892, mining companies that represented 
almost 90 per cent of the output from the Ruhr district had joined the Association (Gemeinschaft) 
in order to negotiate a comprehensive cartel treaty that would overcome the shortcomings of the 
previous arrangements.
20 In the following months, these negotiations proved to be far from 
straightforward and were often more than close to collapsing. Then, at the end of September 
1892, they gained momentum and a commission was installed that was intended to produce a 
draft version of a treaty. But even now, there still were drawbacks. In the first half of December 
1892, it was declared impossible to persuade the vertically integrated iron and steel producers – 
called foundry mines (Hüttenzechen) – of the district to join the cartel.
21 Afterwards, it took an-
other three months until the remaining mining companies from the district unanimously agreed 
to form the RWKS. Up to this date, the negotiations were again extraordinarily difficult. Two 
deadlines expired without the consent of all required companies having been reached.
22 Although 
most were willing to accept the draft contract, some were still undecided and others demanded 
special rights. As a result, in a meeting held on 28 January, it was ultimately demanded that all 
companies that had not yet approved to join had to do so until 16 February 1893. Otherwise, the 
negotiations would be terminated.
23 After this meeting, the approval of the remaining companies 
came more quickly than expected, so that the RWKS was officially founded on 9 February 
1893.
24 
The First Revision of the Original Contract 
Only 21 months after the foundation of the RWKS, in November 1894, the cartel authorities in-
stalled a commission to revise the original contract. Within this time period, two major short-
                                        
19   For a summary of collusion in the pre-RWKS years, see Pierenkemper (1979). 
20   Unless indicated otherwise, accounts of negotiation processes rely on Verein (1904b). 
21   See the issue of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 17 December 1892 (second morning issue). See also the issue of 
Glückauf dated 17 December 1892. 
22   The first deadline was set to 22 December 1892 (Kölnische Zeitung dated 5 December 1892, morning issue). 
Afterwards, in a meeting held on the 16 December 1892 the commission extended this deadline until 20 
January 1893 (Kölnische Zeitung dated 17 December 1892, second morning issue). 
23   See the issues of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 29 January 1893 (Sunday issue) and 30 January 1893 (first and 
second morning issue). 
24   See the issue of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 9 February 1893 (second morning issue). 10 
comings of this contract had become apparent. At first, the pre-history of failed collusion hung 
like a sword of Damocles over the organisation. The cartel authorities felt that market partici-
pants and cartel members had to be persuaded that, in contrast to its short-lived predecessors, the 
RWKS was indeed powerful and intended to last for a prolonged period of time.
25 This problem 
was aggravated by the fact that in one of the last negotiation rounds in the run-up to the founda-
tion of the cartel, the duration of the RWKS had been reduced from ten to only five years. 
The second shortcoming was the design of the dynamic quota regime. The contract of 1893 
stipulated two different ways for a cartel member to increase its production allowance. First, it 
could apply for a higher quota for its existing production facilities. In this case, the cartel au-
thorities could refuse an increase, if they judged that the coal market was incapable of absorbing 
the additional output. Second, a cartel member could sink a new production shaft. Thereby, it 
could automatically raise its quota by 120,000 metric tons and, for the cartel authorities, there 
was no way to deny the increase. In the years 1893 to 1895, the members of the RWKS had 
made excessive use of this privilege for new shafts and had stretched the words of the respective 
paragraph to the maximum: new shafts were sunk and then closed down again, once the larger 
cartel quota was granted, ventilation shafts were turned into production shafts, and shafts were 
equipped with additional extraction lifts, as double shafts would be counted as two units of pro-
duction (Peters, 1989).
26 The uncontrolled increase in individual production allowances severely 
complicated the control of output and the cartel authorities regarded it as the major threat to the 
existence of the whole organisation.
27 
The commission that was installed to revise the original contract issued its suggestions in early 
April 1895. After that, the advisory council of the RWKS discussed and modified the document 
throughout April and sent a final draft to the general assembly in a session on 5 May 1895.
28, 29 
                                        
25   In a meeting of the advisory council (see footnote 26) on 30 May 1895, Tillmann, the chief executive of the 
mining company Tremonia, stated: “[The ten-year term is] essential for the syndicate to work effectively and 
for winning and retaining the trust of the Syndicate not just with its members, but with the entire rest of the 
business community.” Original: “[Die zehnjährige Laufzeit ist] zu einer gedeihlichen Thätigkeit des Syndi-
cats sowie zur Gewinnung und Erhaltung des Zutrauens zum Syndicate nicht bloß der Mitglieder, sondern 
auch der ganzen übrigen Geschäftswelt nothwendig.” (Mining Archive, Bochum, inventory 33, no. 1: Min-
utes of the General Assembly, 1894–1896). 
26   Between 1893 and 1895, the sum of the individual production allowances rose by more than seven percent 
annually; almost two thirds of these increases was due to the privilege for new production shafts (Mining Ar-
chive Bochum, inventory 33, no. 423: Annual Participation Figures; Pilz, 1910). All quota increases by 
120,000 tons or a multiple of 120,000 tons were interpreted as quota increases due to new production shafts 
(see Peters, 1981). 
27   In a meeting of the advisory council (see footnote 26) on 9 April 1895, Emil Kirdorf, head of the council and 
chief executive of the Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG, stated that “no clause [of the first agreement turned 
out to be] [...] so critical for the Syndicate”. Original: “[...] keine Bestimmung [des ersten Abkommens hat 
sich als] [...] so bedenklich für das Syndicat erwiesen”. (Mining Archive, Bochum, inventory 33, no. 50: 
Minutes of the Advisory Council, 1895). 
28   The most important bodies of the RWKS were the executive board, the advisory council, and the general 
assembly. The executive board was indirectly elected by the general assembly (via a supervisory board). It 
set the sales prices, defined the deductions from the redistributed revenues, and imposed the fines for non-
compliance with delivery commitments. Membership and voting rights in the advisory council were granted 
on the basis of coal output. For each 1,000,000 tons of output, a cartel member could claim one seat in the 
council (small mines could combine their output to obtain a seat). In contrast to its denomination, de facto the 
advisory council was the most powerful of the cartel’s bodies. It defined the basis for the price-setting of the 11 
In this session, it also defined the prerequisite for the formal acceptance of the revised contract: 
the agreement of all members.
30 Then, the discussions in the general assembly continued for an-
other two months, but despite an already overwhelming majority in favour of the revised con-
tract, unanimous consent could not be reached, as some companies kept on requesting special 
treatment.
31 Thus, in a final meeting of the general assembly on 26 June 1895, it was ultimately 
declared that either all members sent binding notes of approval to the cartel authorities until 22 
July or the negotiations would be terminated.
32 In effect, the two companies finally gave up their 
reservations, and in a session of the advisory council on 23 July 1895, the agreement of all mem-
bers was announced.
33 In a meeting of the general assembly dated 31 July 1895, all members of 
the RWKS then unanimously voted in favour of the new document. 
The revised contract came into effect on 1 January 1896. Compared to the original contract, there 
were two major changes. First, its duration was set to ten years. Second, the privilege for new 
production shafts was cut back, but not abolished. Now, the cartel authorities were allowed to 
judge the technical feasibility of new production shafts. However, they still could not refuse an 
increase with reference to their evaluation of market capacity. Moreover, the effectiveness of the 
new stipulations was diminished by transitional provisions attached to the revised contract that 
guaranteed grandfathering for 30 to 50 applications for quota increases on the basis of the origi-
nal contract.
34 
The Second Revision of the Original Contract 
By the turn of the century new challenges for the RWKS had emerged, in particular increasing 
outsider competition within the area that the cartel authorities considered as non-competitive. 
The most important outside threat were the foundry mines from the Ruhr district that had refused 
to join the cartel in 1892. In the first ten years of its operation, they had not only stabilised their 
position. In contrast, their market share in the coal output of the Ruhr district was ever increas-
ing. Whereas in 1893 their output accounted for only 10 percent of the total output from the dis-
trict, this share had grown to 19 percent by 1903.
35 The increase was partly due to the fact that 
the foundry mines had bought a substantial number of cartel members whose production would 
have been outside of the control of the organisation once the contracts of 1896 expired at the end 
                                                                                                                           
executive council, finally decided on applications for quota increases, and arbitrated disputes between the ex-
ecutive council and individual cartel members. Furthermore, it could install commissions for a wide variety 
of topics. In the general assembly, voting rights were also allocated on the basis of coal output. For every 
10,000 tons of output, a member received one seat. The general assembly decided on the acceptance of new 
cartel members, had to agree on the common percentage reductions of production allowances, and imposed 
the fines for production in excess of cartel quotas. 
29   See the issues of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 5 May 1895 (Sunday issue) and 12 May 1895 (Sunday issue). 
30   The guidelines are printed in Verein (1904b). 
31   See the issue of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 31 May (first morning issue). 
32   See the issue of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 27 June 1895 (second morning issue). 
33   See the issues of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 24 July 1895 (first morning issue and evening issue). 
34   The transitional provisions of the second contract mention 28 shafts. In contrast, in the first morning issue of 
4 November 1895 the Kölnische Zeitung mentions 40 to 50 shafts. 
35   Calculated from figures provided in Verein (1904a), Verein (1904b), and Pilz (1910). 12 
of 1905.
36 Apart from increasing outsider competition, the privilege for new shafts was still on 
the agenda, as the previous changes had proven to be insufficient for slowing down the uncon-
trolled increase of production allowances (Peters, 1981). 
As a result of these new and old challenges, in February 1902 a high-ranked commission was 
installed to prepare another substantial revision of the cartel contract and negotiate with the out-
siders in the Ruhr district, in particular with the foundry mines, about their inclusion in the or-
ganisation. It took more than one year until the commission was able to present a draft version of 
a new contract in the first half of May 1903. In July and September 1903, the draft was negoti-
ated in three meetings of the general assembly and finally, in a meeting held on 30 September 
1903, all members of the RWKS agreed on the revised document.
37 This time, however, their 
consent was not sufficient for the new contract to be formally accepted. A clause in the revised 
document demanded that in addition to all current members, the foundry mines of the Ruhr dis-
trict had to join the cartel by 31 December 1903. Otherwise, the revision would remain irrele-
vant. In order to negotiate the terms of the foundry mines’ participation, another commission was 
installed. In the end, it was successful and all companies whose participation had been made the 
conditio sine qua non for the coming into effect of the new contract finally joined the RWKS. As 
a result, on 29 December 1903 the general assembly could formally accept the third contract.
38 
Without a doubt, the most important change from the second to the third contract was the inclu-
sion of the former cartel outsiders. However, this change came at substantial costs. In order to 
persuade the vertically integrated companies to join the cartel, they were granted cartel quotas 
that exceeded their actual output substantially (Wilhelm, 1966). Furthermore, the coal they self-
consumed to run their blast furnaces and foundries remained outside of the quota system and was 
not subject to any delivery requirements. In effect it could not be controlled by the cartel authori-
ties at all. These privileges were extraordinarily advantageous for the former outsiders: on the 
one hand, in times of booming demand for iron and steel they could use all the coal they ex-
tracted themselves; on the other hand, if demand for iron and steel was sluggish, they could insist 
on the obligation of the RWKS to buy the output they were allowed to produce according to their 
oversized cartel quotas (Wiedenfeld, 1912).
39 For the non-integrated companies in the organisa-
tion, these advantages of the foundry mines were a heavy burden. They could not fully partici-
pate in upswings of the iron and steel market and had to accept higher restrictions of their quotas 
when demand for iron and steel was low. In addition, they were disproportionately burdened 
with the financing of sales subsidies and overhead costs, as coal for self-consumption was also 
exempted from the percentage deduction on revenues. The severity of the conflict of interest be-
                                        
36   Stigler (1951) argues that – by raising prices above marginal costs – the RWKS itself set incentives for 
down-stream producers (i.e., iron- and steel-producing companies) to buy the suppliers of their input (i.e., 
coal), instead of buying it on the cartelised market. 
37   See the issues of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 7 July 1903 (first morning issue), 12 July 1903 (Sunday issue), 
13 July 1903 (first morning issue), 16 September 1903 (first morning issue), and 1 October 1903 (first morn-
ing issue). 
38   See the issue of the Kölnische Zeitung dated 30 December 1903 (first morning issue). 
39   One might conclude that the privileges of the foundry mines stimulated mining companies to integrate for-
ward into iron and steel production. However, in the years 1904–1913, only one mining company made this 
decisive step. 13 
tween foundry mines and non-vertically integrated mines is illuminated by the fact that – al-
though the privileges were hotly disputed right from the start – both parties were not able to 
agree on their revision up to the First World War. As late as 1915, when the German Federal 
Government finally forced the RWKS members to sign a new contract, all preferential treatment 
of the foundry mines was abolished (Burke, 1979). 
Apart from the incorporation of the foundry mines, the new cartel contract brought about two 
other significant changes. First, the privilege for new shafts was completely abolished. Second, 
the revised contract included clauses that were intended to deter entry and to deal with competi-
tion from cartel outsiders. The RWKS was allowed to buy unworked coal fields in the Ruhr dis-
trict and the neighbouring regions, in order to prohibit their exploitation by potential outsiders. In 
addition, it could also engage in price wars with competing mining companies, if the cartel au-
thorities judged this necessary to achieve the aims of the organisation. 
4.   Methodology 
Event Studies 
In section 3, we showed that the RWKS was willing and able to stabilise coal prices. As a result, 
we rejected scenarios (3) (monopolistic pricing without price stabilisation) and (4) (complete 
ineffectiveness of the RWKS) outlined in section 2. In order to evaluate the plausibility of the 
remaining scenarios (1) (mean preserving price stabilisation) and (2) (price stabilisation above 
the mean preserving level), next we have to analyse the effect of price stabilisation on the profit-
ability of the cartel members. Therefore, in a first step, we employ event study methodology. 
Event studies examine the economic effect of an event by looking at changes of stock prices. The 
types of investigated events are manifold and range from announcements of stock splits and 
dividend payments to takeovers and regulatory activity (for summaries, see Binder, 1998; 
MacKinlay, 1997; Peterson, 1989).
40 Event studies make use of the fact that on an information-
efficient stock market, stock prices should mirror expected profitability, and new information 
should be immediately reflected in them.
41 For the case investigated in this study, this means that 
if contemporary investors expected a change in the profitability of companies participating in the 
RWKS due to the formation of the cartel or due to the two major revisions of its original con-
tract, these expectations should show up instantaneously in the stock price series of these com-
panies. In particular, higher expected profits should result in a jump of stock prices. 
                                        
40   In addition, event study methodology in combination with government bonds is also used to assess the effects 
of historical events or current political crises. Frey/Waldenström (2004) investigate the changing fortunes of 
the Allies and Nazi-Germany during the Second World War; Brown/Burdenkin (2000), Weidenmier (2000), 
and Willard et al. (1996) look at turning points in the US Civil War; Chaney (forthcoming) examines the 
pacification policy in Iraq after the US-led intervention in 2003. 
41    For a treatment of stock market efficiency and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, see Copeland/Weston 
(1992). 14 
In general, there are two ways of proceeding in an event study. Using the first approach, the 
event dates are determined ex-ante and exogenously, e.g., by consulting newspapers or other 
publications. Then, the stock return at the event date is compared to the ‘normal return’ in a time 
period that is unaffected by the event, usually a period preceding it. The difference between these 
two observations, the ‘abnormal return’, is then interpreted as the market reaction to the occur-
rence of the event.
42 In the second approach, the event dates are endogenously detected by using 
an econometric model to look for “turning points” (Willard et al., 1996) in the data at hand. Af-
terwards, the market reaction at these “turning points” is interpreted in the light of qualitative 
information.
43 In our study, we follow the second approach, as the negotiation processes preced-
ing the three investigated cartel contracts lasted for extended periods of time and a priori we can 
not be sure at which stage of these processes the market reacted. 
The basis of our three event studies – one for each investigated contract – is the well-known and 
widely used market model. Its parameter estimates constitute the ‘normal return’. The model 
predicts that the return R of a company i at time t can be expressed by a company-specific con-
stant (αi), the covariance of the company’s returns with those of a market portfolio (βi Rmt) and 
an error term (εit): 
(1)  Rit = αi + βi Rmt + εit 
In the three event studies, equation (1) is separately estimated for each investigated company. As 
a result, it is possible to account for different distributional forms of the residuals in the com-
pany-specific equations. First, sticking to the standard OLS framework, the error terms can be 








Furthermore, it can also be accounted for the existence of autoregressive conditional heterosce-
dasticity in the error terms, i.e., for the fact that often stock returns cluster in time. In these cases 
the variance of the market model residuals can follow an ARCH (1) or GARCH (1,1) process, 
i.e., they can be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a conditional variance 
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42   On the methodology of this approach, see Armitage (1995); Brown/Warner (1980, 1985); MacKinlay (1997). 
43   The second approach is first and foremost used in studies that look at the level of bond prices (see the refer-
ences in footnote 35), but can also be fruitfully applied to stock returns (see, e.g., Bittner, 2005; 
Cyree/DeGennaro, 2002). 15 
In order to determine the correct specification of each company-specific equation, we use the 
ARCH-Lagrange Multiplier test with four to eight lags.
44 For each contract, the number of OLS, 
ARCH(1), and GARCH(1,1) company equations is displayed in Appendix Table 1. 
The market model is estimated over a time period that covers approximately 600 trading days (or 
two years).
45 Roughly at the middle of this estimation period is the date at which the contract 
under investigation was formally accepted (the exact definition of this date will be provided in 
the empirical section). The window in which we search for abnormal performance due to the 
contract under investigation is also defined by the formal acceptance date. It starts 100 days prior 
to this date and ends 10 days afterwards. In other words, it ranges from day -100 to day +10. By 
the choice of this rather long window, we can be reasonably sure that the main stages of the re-
spective negotiation processes are covered. Furthermore, by including periods after the formal 
acceptance dates, we can also catch possible retarded effects. Within the window we proceed in 
the following way: To model ‘abnormal returns’, the market model is augmented by a dummy 
variable (D) that is equal to one on seven days and equal to zero otherwise
46, 47: 
(4)  Rit = αi + βi Rmt + γi Dit + εit 
At first, this augmented market model is estimated with the dummy centred on day -100. After-
wards, it is estimated with Dit centred on day -99. This procedure is repeated until the dummy is 
centred on day +10 and consecutively performed for all companies in the sample. At any step, 
we collect the value of γi. Furthermore, we perform a Wald test on the exclusion of the dummy 
variable from the model and retain the p-value of its F-statistic. Thus, in the end we have 111 
coefficient estimates and 111 p-values for every investigated company. 
Next, the company-specific p-values are aggregated in the cross-section using the method pro-
posed by Fisher (1932). The result of this exercise is a series of χ
2-distributed test statistics with 
2N degrees of freedom (where N is the number of units in the cross-section). Possible event 
date(s) are then detected by looking for maximums in this series, as these should represent dates 
at which several or all companies in the sample performed abnormally. Afterwards, these peaks 
are compared to qualitative information on the negotiation processes. If there is sufficient evi-
dence that a maximum can be attributed to one of the steps in these processes we first evaluate 
the average γi-coefficient value at the respective date and count the number of significant coeffi-
cients to obtain an impression of the actual effect. Second, we apply a non-parametric binomial 
                                        
44   The test results are not reported, but available on request. 
45   At the stock exchange in Berlin, there usually were six trading days a week (Monday to Saturday). 
46   The length of the event window has to be chosen arbitrarily. On the one hand, it must be long enough to dis-
criminate between substantial “turning points” and “blips” (Willard, 1996). Furthermore, new information of-
tentimes trickles down slowly so that the full adjustment of the market to a new information set can take sev-
eral days. On the other hand, if an excessively long window is chosen, this reduces the chance of detecting 
multiple breaks, as “turning points” of different sign can possibly offset each other. In order to check the ro-
bustness of our results to different specifications of the event window, re-estimated all event studies with 
symmetric windows covering three, eleven, 15, 21, and 31 days. The findings from these robustness checks 
will be presented alongside those of the seven-day specification. 
47   In the event study of the second revision of the original contract, we include another dummy variable to ac-
count for the breakdown of the Imperial Ottoman Bank on 9 November 1895 (see Gelman/Burhop, 2008). 16 
sign test to the estimated γi-coefficients at this date to assess whether the observed effect runs 
into the same direction for all investigated companies (i.e., whether the signs of the γi-
coefficients are positive or negative throughout). Finally, we use correlation analysis to gain a 
deeper insight into the determinants of company-specific abnormal performance (the design of 
this analysis will be presented in the next section). 
This methodology assumes that the event dates are identical for all companies. In this respect, it 
differs from Bittner’s (2005) event study on the RWKS, which employs different company-
specific event dates. We think that opting for a common event date is more plausible, since at the 
date when news about the state of the negotiation process became public knowledge, the same 
set of information should have simultaneously been available for the assessment of all consid-
ered companies’ expected profitability. 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
To cross-check the validity of the findings from the event studies, we will also assess the per-
formance effect of the RWKS by a joint analysis of accounting figures as well as financial and 
output data. In this combined analysis, we use dynamic panel data models. The dependent vari-
ables are two measures of company performance. At first, we use the RoA, i.e., accounting prof-
its divided by the book value of total assets, as a measure of company profitability. In addition, 
we also look at the expected profitability of the investigated companies as modelled by Tobin’s q 
ratio (Tobin, 1969). The latter measure of company performance is superior to the former (or 
other accounting ratios like the RoE), because it is unaffected by arbitrary accounting conven-
tions and manipulations. Furthermore, the q ratio also proxies monopoly rents (Lindenberg/Ross, 
1981) and thus, more adequately captures possible effects of cartelisation. The q ratio is calcu-
lated by dividing the market value of a company by its replacement value. Market valuation is 
defined by the nominal value of outstanding stocks multiplied by their end-of-year stock price. 
The replacement value figures are calculated using the perpetuary inventory method of Linden-
berg/Ross (1981). Thus, the book value of the companies in our sample is adjusted for invest-
ment, depreciation, price changes, and the technological progress of the current and of preceding 
periods.
48 
The regressors are the same for both independent variables. Cartelisation is modelled by a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in years when a company was a member of the RWKS and 
equal to zero otherwise. In addition to the cartel variable, we add a number of control variables 
that might influence company performance. First, we include the debt ratio – calculated as the 
book value of total debt divided by the book value of total assets – as a measure of leverage. A 
priori, the sign of this variable is indeterminate. High leverage can serve as a disciplining device 
for managers and, thus, have a positive effect on company performance (Grossman/Hart, 1982). 
                                        
48    The formulation and data sources of the replacement costs series are laid out in the appendix of Bur-
hop/Lübbers (forthcoming). 17 
However, it is also possible that it forces the management of a company to forgo positive net 
present value investment projects (Myers, 1977). In this case, the effect on company perform-
ance would be negative. Second, the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets is in-
cluded as a proxy for company size. A positive (negative) coefficient of this variable indicates 
positive (negative) economies to scale. Third, company growth – defined as the first difference 
of the log of total coal output
49 – is added to the equations. This variable proxies for growth op-
portunities and should have a positive effect on company performance. All three control vari-
ables are interacted with the RWKS dummy. The terms including company size and growth test 
a hypothesis often brought forward in the literature on the RWKS, namely that larger companies 
with greater growth opportunities were the chief beneficiaries of cartelisation, because – due to a 
superior access to external finance – they could most likely exploit the privilege for new shafts 
(Bittner, 2005; Goetzke, 1905; Peters, 1981). The interaction between the cartel dummy and lev-
erage considers the possibility that companies with a high ratio of debt to total assets might have 
profited more, because as a result of decreasing price volatility after the formation of the RWKS, 
debtors demanded a lower risk premium for their commitments (Scherer/Ross, 1990). Finally, 
we include company and time fixed effects (αi and ηt). The former account for company-specific 
characteristics that are invariant over time, e.g., geological conditions. The latter capture effects 
that are the same for all companies, but change over time, such as movements of the business 
cycle or technological progress. We also tested a dummy variable that would have accounted for 
the fact that some of the companies in the sample are vertically integrated foundry mines, while 
the majority of companies were only engaged in mining. Since this variable was insignificant in 
all estimated equations, the results of this exercise are not displayed (but are available on re-
quest).
50 
Dynamic is introduced into the model by including the first lag of the dependent variables among 
the regressors. For the choice of a dynamic model, there are both theoretical and practical rea-
sons. Theoretically, it is straightforward to assume that current profitability is partly determined 
by past profitability and that expectations about profitability are influenced by former expected 
profitability. Furthermore, it is oftentimes suggested that managers in Imperial Germany used 
depreciations and reserves to smoothen profits and dividend payments over the business cycle 
(Hanf, 1978). Practically, a dynamic model is recommended, because the residuals of the static 
models show signs of significant autocorrelation.
51 Thus, we estimate the following models, 
where εi,t is normally distributed disturbance term with an expected value of zero and constant 
variance: 
 
                                        
49   As it was impossible to store larger quantities of coal for extended periods of time (see section 2), output 
growth should also be a good proxy for the growth of sales. 
50   The finding that there are no systematic differences in performance between vertically integrated and non-
integrated companies conflicts with the results of studies that use modern data from the United States and re-
port significant diversification discounts in the 1960s and 1980s (Lang/Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996). 
51   The test results are not reported but available on request. 18 
(5) RoAi,t = γ RoAi,t-1 + β1 LEVERAGEi,t + β2 log(SIZEi,t) + β3 GROWTHi,t + β4 RWKSi,t + 
β5 LEVERAGEi,t * RWKSi,t + β6 log(SIZEi,t) * RWKSi,t + β7 GROWTHi,t * RWKSi,t + αi 
+ ηt + εi,t 
and 
(6)  qi,t = γ qi,t-1 + β1 LEVERAGEi,t + β2 log(SIZEi,t) + β3 GROWTHi,t + β4 RWKSi,t + β5 
LEVERAGEi,t * RWKSi,t + β6 log(SIZEi,t) * RWKSi,t + β7 GROWTHi,t * RWKSi,t + αi + 
ηt + εi,t. 
Notwithstanding that opting for a dynamic specification seems well-justified, the choice of the 
actual estimator is far from being straightforward. On the one hand, using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with fixed effects results in biased coefficient estimates. On the other hand, the 
existing unbiased estimators – e.g., the instrumental variable estimator proposed by Ander-
son/Hsiao (1981, 1982) or the Generalised Method of Moments estimators developed by 
Arellano/Bond (1991) – are designed for panels with a large number of observations in the cross-
section (N) and few in the time dimension (T) and inefficient in large T small N settings (our 
panel covers 33 years and 33 cross-sections).
52 However, in our case, there are good reasons for 
using the OLS fixed effects estimator. First of all, its bias decreases as T becomes larger and will 
disappear if T approaches infinity (Nickell, 1981). Furthermore, the bias is larger in the estimates 
of the dynamic parameter γ than in the coefficient estimates of the other independent variables, 
which usually are the main focus of interest in empirical research. As a result, simulation studies 
show that for panels with a time dimension of 30 observations or more, the dynamic OLS fixed 
effects estimator is the best choice (Beck/Katz, 2004; Judson/Owen, 1999). 
5.   Data 
Our dataset for the event studies includes daily stock prices of all 21 joint-stock mining compa-
nies that operated in the Ruhr district between 1892 and 1913 and that were listed at the stock 
exchange in Berlin. All companies were members of the RWKS since its foundation in 1893. 
The information on one of these companies had to be omitted, because its stock price series were 
too fragmentary to be considered in a quantitative analysis. Another company had to be dropped 
from the investigation, as it was liquidated soon after the foundation of the cartel. As a result, in 
the event study of the first RWKS contract we can examine 19 mining companies. For the sec-
ond and the third contract, this number is reduced to 18 and 14 companies, respectively, as com-
panies disappeared as a result of takeover activity. 
The stock prices were collected from the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung. The stock market index in the 
market model is the weighted performance index constructed by Gelman/Burhop (2008). In or-
der to make our stock price series compatible with the index, we applied the same performance 
                                        
52   A corrected dynamic OLS fixed-effects estimator proposed by Kiviet (1995) produces both unbiased and 
efficient estimates. However, it cannot be applied to unbalanced panels. 19 
modifications. This means that the original series were corrected for dividend payments, sub-
scription rights, and broken period interest.
53 A positive side effect of this procedure is the elimi-
nation of outliers that are solely due to technical market reactions, which should have a positive 
effect on the fit of the regressions. Returns were calculated by transforming the index and the 
corrected stock price series into natural logarithms and then calculating first differences. 
The qualitative sources needed to interpret the findings from the event studies are printed docu-
ments, a contemporary newspaper, and a contemporary journal. First of all, we used the detailed 
accounts in the data and source compendium Die Entwickelung des Niederrheinisch-
Westfälischen Steinkohlen-Bergbaues in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts edited by the 
Verein für die bergbaulichen Interessen im Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, the first and fore-
most lobby organisation of the mining industry in the Ruhr district and a fierce proponent of 
cartelisation. Furthermore, we consulted the Kölnische Zeitung, a daily newspaper published in 
the city of Cologne, around 40 km south of the Ruhr district.
54 Due to the close geographical 
proximity, it provided an extensive coverage of the mining industry in the district. In addition, it 
also reproduced rumours brought forward by other newspapers, so that it is very likely that in 
one way or another interesting news would actually appear in it. Finally, we read the weekly is-
sues of the well-informed and low-tempered mining trade journal Glückauf. 
As mentioned in section 4, a crucial prerequisite for the application of event study methodology 
is the information efficiency of the investigated stock market. For the case of the Berlin stock 
exchange in Imperial Germany, a study by DeLong/Becht (1992) questions this property. Using 
Shillers (1981) concept of excess volatility, they argue that stock prices in Imperial Germany 
followed their fundamentals too closely to be compatible with the concept of an information ef-
ficient market and attribute this finding to the dominant role of large joint-stock credit banks. 
However, Becht/DeLong consider annual data only and use an outdated annual stock price index 
designed by Donner (1934). As a result, more recent empirical studies based on investigations of 
daily data find that the information efficiency of the stock exchange in Berlin was comparable to 
that of modern stock exchanges in Europe and the United States (Baltzer, 2006; Gehrig/Fohlin, 
2006; Gelman/Burhop, 2008).
55 
The annual accounting figures and ultimo stock market quotations that are required for the dy-
namic panel data analysis are available for the above-mentioned 21 companies as well. They 
were compiled from annual balance sheets and stock market data published in Saling’s Börsen-
Jahrbuch and Der Deutsche Ökonomist. From the same sources and from the data appendix of 
Feldenkirchen (1982), we also have accounting figures and ultimo stock quotations of nine foun-
dry mines that joined the RWKS in 1904 and of three cartel outsiders – two foundry mines from 
Upper Silesia and one from the Aachen mining district. Output data was collected from Huske 
                                        
53   For a detailed discussion of the different performance corrections, see Gelman/Burhop (2008); Ronge (2002). 
54   Cologne was also the home of the most important financial market place in the Western part of Imperial Ger-
many, the Cologne stock exchange. 
55    Baltzer (2006) analyses cross-listings; Gehrig/Fohlin (2006) look at transactions costs; Gelman/Burhop 
(2008) investigate the autocorrelation of stock returns. 20 
(1987), the Jahrbuch für den Oberbergamtsbezirk Dortmund, the Jahrbuch für den Oberberg-
amtsbezirk Breslau, and from archival sources in the Münster State Archive. 
The resulting panel is unbalanced and covers years from 1881 to 1913. The included companies 
represent between 23.25 (in 1881) and 50.73 (in 1907) percent of the coal output from the Ruhr 
district and between 13.13 (in 1881) and 31.33 (in 1907) percent of total German coal output.
56 
The sample of the event studies covers between 30.05 (in 1913) and 42.63 (in 1898) percent of 
the coal output from the Ruhr district and between 18.05 (in 1913) and 22.71 (in 1898) percent 
of total German coal output in the years 1892 to 1913. 
6.   Empirical Results 
Event Studies 
ORIGINAL CONTRACT 
A crucial step in the application of our event study procedure is the definition of the formal ac-
ceptance date, because this date defines the overall estimation period as well as the 111-day pe-
riod in which we search for abnormal performance. In the following, it will be defined as the first 
a priori known date, at which there could be no more doubts that all required companies had 
agreed to the contract under consideration. In the case of the original contract, this date is 9 Feb-
ruary 1893, i.e., the foundation date of the RWKS. Defined by this date, the estimation period of 
the event study covers the 616 trading days between 2 January 1892 and 30 December 1894. The 
111-day window in which we search for abnormal performance ranges from 14 October 1892 to 
20 February 1893. The results of the event study of the original contract indicate two peaks in 
abnormal performance (see Figure 1). The first and largest is situated in the period between 8 
and 15 December 1892 (i.e., that the dummy variable is centred on 12 December) and the second 
and slightly smaller one in-between 28 January and 4 February 1893 (i.e., that the dummy vari-
able is centred on 1 February). 
The first of these peaks is situated in a time period when the prospects for achieving a compre-
hensive agreement looked dim. In its session on 16 December 1892, the commission that led the 
negotiations on the draft contract would officially declare that the foundry mines of the Ruhr 
district were not willing to join the cartel. Furthermore, it would announce that the first deadline 
for the consent of all remaining companies could also not be sustained and would thus be ex-
tended until 20 January 1893. In the morning issue of 19 December 1892, the Kölnische Zeitung 
quoted a comment from the Berliner Börsen-Courier on the session of the commission it thought 
summarised the mood at the Berlin stock exchange quite accurately: 
                                        
56   Significantly increasing the coverage of the panel was impossible, as most of the remaining German mining 
companies were organised as Gewerkschaft. In contrast to joint-stock companies, Gewerkschaften were not 
obliged to disclose information about their operations. Moreover, the balance sheets of those companies, 
which made them up voluntarily were not published with the same regularity as those of the joint-stock com-
panies (for information on the organisational form “Gewerkschaft”, see Friedrich, 1979). 21 
“This desperately resembles a complete failure of syndicate endeavours.“57 
The results of the event study show a clear negative assessment of the situation by the stock mar-
ket (for the results of all three event studies, see Table 2). The coefficient of the dummy variable 
centred on 12 December 1892 is negative in 18 out of 19 company-specific equations.
58 In 9 out 
of 19 cases it is negative and significant. Its average value is -1.06.
59 
Figure 1: Aggregated p-Values of Wald Tests (Original Contract) 
 
The second peak is situated in the period between the meeting on 28 January 1893, where the 
last indecisive companies were ultimately demanded to agree to cartel formation and the founda-
tion of the RWKS on 8 February 1893. Thus, it is straightforward to argue that at this time con-
temporary investors reacted to the prospective foundation of the organisation. Their assessment 
was positive. The coefficient of the dummy variable centred on 1 February 1893 is positive in all 
                                        
57   Original: “Das sieht einem vollständigen Scheitern der Syndicatsbestrebungen verzweifelt ähnlich.” 
58   As a result, the binomial sign test rejects the hypothesis that positive and negative coefficients are the same in 
number. 
59   Re-estimating the event study of the original contract with different specifications of the event window, we 
detected peaks in the same time periods that are suggested by the results of the seven-day specification using 
a three-, an eleven, and a 15-day event window. In all three cases, the average values of the γi-coefficients are 
smaller than in the original specification. Employing a 21- and a 31-day event window, we could only detect 



















































































































































































































































19 company-specific equations. In 12 out of 19 cases it is positive and significant. Its average 
value is 0.83.
60 
Although the event study shows opposite effects in the two detected event periods, the economic 
interpretation of the findings is almost the same. During the first period, contemporary investors 
expected that not having a cartel would reduce the profitability of the investigated mining com-
panies. In the second period, when they were persuaded that cartel formation was ensured, they 
expected increasing profits. Thus, overall cartelisation was regarded as having a positive effect 
on company performance. However, it should be noted that the positive effect due to the pro-
spective foundation of the RWKS hardly made up the former negative one.
61 All in all and in 
line with the results of Bittner’s (2005) study, it must therefore be concluded that the foundation 
of the RWKS left the expectations of contemporary investors concerning the profitability of the 
cartel members almost unchanged. 
Table 2: Results of Event Studies 
 


















Average value of γi-
coefficients 
-1.061 0.828 0.142 0.162 0.040 0.853
   
Company-specific coefficients   
     Negative and significant  18 (9) 0 (0) 7 (2) 8 (4) 9 (3)  0 (0)
     Positive and significant  1 (0) 19 (12) 11 (2) 10 (6) 9 (2)  14 (10)
   
Binomial sign test (p-value)*  0.000 0.000 0.481 0.815 1.000 0.000
Note: Number of positive/negative and significant company-specific γi-coefficients in the respective event periods in 
parentheses; *Null hypothesis of the test is that positive and negative company-specific γi-coefficients in the respec-
tive event period are the same in number (i.e., the test evaluates whether the signs of the company-specific γi-
coefficients in the respective event period are positive or negative throughout). 
 
In order to test whether the measured effect was different for different companies, we make the 
company-specific dummy variable coefficient estimates subject to a simple correlation analy-
sis.
62 More specifically, we investigate whether company-specific abnormal performance can be 
related to the discrete control variables of the dynamic panel data analysis, i.e., leverage, com-
pany size, and growth.
63 The underlying hypotheses are the ones presented in the discussion of 
                                        
60   Naturally, the binomial sign test clearly rejects the hypothesis that positive and negative coefficients are the 
same in number. 
61   The larger average dummy variable coefficient in the first period is largely due to the extraordinary large 
coefficient in one company-specific equation. If the coefficients of this company is excluded in the calcula-
tion of the average dummy variable coefficients at both peaks, the absolute value of the one at the second 
peak will be slightly larger (-0.73 compared to 0.81). 
62   We employ Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. Due to the small size of our sample, significance test are 
based on the t-distribution rather than the normal approximation. We also estimated the correlations using the 
z-standardised γi-coefficients instead of the un-standardised ones. As the results of both estimations are – 
with respect to significant correlations – the same, those using the z-standardised γi-coefficients are not re-
ported (but available on request). 
63   Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets at the end of 1892. Company 
size is measured by the book value total assets at the end of 1892. Growth is approximated by the first differ-
ence of the natural logarithms of coal output at the end on 1892 and 1891. 23 
the interaction terms in equations (5) and (6), i.e.: larger companies with greater growth opportu-
nities profited more from cartelisation, because they were the chief beneficiaries of the privilege 
for new shafts; and: companies with a higher ratio of debt to total assets profited more, because 
their debtors might have demanded a lower risk premium as a result of decreasing price volatility 
after the formation of the RWKS. We confine the analysis to the coefficients of the dummy cen-
tred on 1 February 1893, because we have no exact information on the wording of draft versions 
of the cartel contract and in particular, we do not know at which stage in the negotiation process 
the privilege for new shafts was included. The results of the analysis do not support the hypothe-
ses mentioned above, as we detect no significant correlation between company size, growth, and 
the company-specific coefficient estimates (see Appendix Table 3). Thus, contemporary inves-
tors seem to have made a sectoral rather than a company-specific judgement. 
Figure 2: Aggregated p-Values of Wald Tests (First Revision) 
First Revision 
In the case of the first revision of the original contract, the formal acceptance date is 23 July 
1895, when in a meeting of the advisory council it was announced that all cartel members had 
provided binding written statements to accept the revised document.
64 Given this date, we de-
fined an estimation period of 609 trading days for the event study that ranges from 2 July 1894 to 
30 June 1896. The window in which we search for abnormal performance covers the 111 trading 
days between 23 March and 3 August 1895. In the event study of the second contract, we identi-
                                        
64   Given the binding character of these statements, the actual vote on the revised contract in the general assem-



















































































































































































































































fied three peaks in abnormal performance (see Figure 2). All of them are situated before the date 
on which this contract was formally accepted. Furthermore, all three are smaller than the ones we 
detected in the event study of the original contract. The first peak is located in the period be-
tween 4 and 11 May 1895 (i.e., that the dummy variable is centred on 8 May), the second be-
tween 27 May and 6 June 1895 (i.e., that the dummy variable is centred on 30 May), and the 
third between 6 and 13 July 1895 (i.e., that the dummy variable is centred on 10 July).
65 
Looking at the qualitative information on the negotiation process preceding the second contract, 
all three peaks can be associated with particular steps. At the first peak, contemporary investors 
presumably reacted to the meeting of the advisory council on 4 May 1895, in which a draft ver-
sion of the new contract was sent to the general assembly for further discussion. The second and 
largest peak can be associated with the meeting of the general assembly on 30 June 1895, in 
which the overwhelming majority of the members agreed on the new contract and the last indeci-
sive companies were ultimately demanded to approve. Finally, the third peak is situated between 
this meeting of the general assembly and the formal acceptance date. During this period contem-
porary investors possibly got early notice of the fact that the approval of all members was se-
cured. This interpretation is supported by qualitative evidence. In its issue of 13 July 1895, 
Glückauf postulated that “agreement on the Syndicate contract can now be considered a given”.
66 
The results of the event study give no clear-cut indication of contemporary investors’ assess-
ments of the second contract. On the one hand, the average coefficient values of the dummy 
variables are positive on all three occasions. On the other hand, there are positive as well as 
negative dummy variable coefficients in the company-specific equations, and in no case does the 
binomial sign test reject the Null hypothesis that positive and negative coefficients are the same 
in number. To put it in a nutshell, it seems impossible to argue compellingly for either a positive 
or a negative aggregate effect of the first revision of the original contract. Thus, the most likely 
interpretation is that the revisions made – slightly cutting back the privilege for new shafts and 
extending the duration of the contract to ten years – were not considered substantial by contem-
porary investors and, as a result, their neutral expectations concerning the performance effect of 
the RWKS persisted. 
The results from the correlation analysis using the company-specific coefficient estimates pro-
vide some supplementary insights. In addition to the variables used in the analysis of the original 
contract,
67 we define three more variables. The first one is the total growth of the cartel quota 
                                        
65   Re-estimating the event study of the first revision with different specifications of the event window, we were 
not able to detect the same three peaks suggested by the seven-day specification. With a three- and an eleven-
day window, we detected only one peak. In both cases, it is situated in the time period that is covered by the 
second peak identified with the seven-day window. In the specifications using event windows of 15, 21, and 
31 days we failed to identify any peaks that correspondent to one of the three peaks in the original specifica-
tion. 
66   Original: “[…]der Abschluß des Syndicatsvertrages als gesichert gelten kann”. 
67   In the case of the first revision of the original contract, leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book 
value of total assets at the end of 1894. Company size is measured by the book value of total assets at the end 
of 1894. Growth is approximated by the first difference of the natural logarithms of coal output at the end on 
1894 and 1893. 25 
during the valid time of the original contract. It indicates the success of a company to improve its 
absolute and relative position in the cartel. The second variable is the share of quota increases 
due to new shafts in total quota growth. It measures how much a company relied on the privilege 
for new shafts in order to improve its position. The third variable is a dichotomous variable that 
is equal to one if a company was listed in the transitory provisions attached to the second cartel 
contract and equal to zero otherwise. As in the case of the original contract, most of the correla-
tions are statistically insignificant (see Appendix Table 3). However, the analysis of the com-
pany-specific coefficients of the dummy centred on 10 July 1895 reveals one interesting fact. We 
observe a positive and significant correlation with the share of quota increases due to new shafts 
in total quota growth. Thus, the companies that were able heavily to exploit the privilege for new 
shafts during the period of the first contract profited more. Again, this implies that the privilege 
was not cut back effectively. Furthermore, it shows that rather than improving the situation of all 
cartel members, the first revision of the original contract – or more precisely, the lack of substan-
tial revision – served the specific interest of only some. 
Second Revision 





















































































































































































































































In the case of the second revision of the original contract, the formal acceptance date is 29 De-
cember 1903, when in a meeting of the general assembly all members of the RWKS as well as 
the newly-acceded foundry mines voted unanimously to accept the new document. Hence, the 
estimation period covers the 610 trading days from 2 January 1903 to 31 December 1904. The 26 
111-day window in which we search for abnormal performance ranges from 29 August 1903 to 
11 January 1904. In the event study, we identified one clear peak in abnormal performance (see 
Figure 3). As in the case of the second contract, it is situated considerably in advance of the for-
mal acceptance date. The size of the peak is comparable to those in the event study of the origi-
nal contract. It is located in the period between 10 and 17 October 1903 (i.e., that the dummy 
variable is centred on 14 October). 
Comparing the results of the event study to the qualitative information at hand, it seems not too 
far-fetched to assume that during the detected period, contemporary investors became persuaded 
that the foundry mines were now willing to join the RWKS. In its issue of 10 October 1903, the 
mining journal Glückauf noted: 
“The Syndicate can now be expected to materialise entirely as planned.”
68 
The market’s assessment was positive throughout. The coefficient of the dummy variable centred 
on 14 October 1903 is positive in all 14 company-specific equations.
69 In ten out of 14 cases, it is 
also significant. Its average value is 0.85. Economically, these results suggest that contemporary 
investors expected increasing profits for the cartel members after the successful second revision 
of the original contract. However, one should note that the size of the average dummy variable 
coefficient is far from being impressive. The value of 0.85 implies that on average the second 
revision of the original contract increased the market valuation of the cartel members by around 
6 percent in the seven days covered by the dummy variable. This is roughly equivalent to the 
‘abnormal returns’ a takeover target in the mining industry of the Ruhr district would have real-
ised over the same period (Lübbers, forthcoming). As in the case of the original contract, the cor-
relation analysis revealed no significant results (see Appendix Table 3).
70 
In sum, the results of the event studies seem to support scenario (2) (price stabilisation above the 
mean preserving level) rather than scenario (1) (mean preserving price stabilisation) because 
overall, they do not indicate lower profits for the cartel members. In addition, the findings from 
the event study of the second revision of the original contract even point to a small positive per-
formance effect. 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis 
Before we come to a final conclusion regarding the scenarios outlined in section 2, we now aug-
ment the results of the event studies by the findings from the dynamic panel data analysis. Since 
                                        
68   Original: “Es steht nun mehr zu erwarten, daß das Syndikat in dem ganzen Umfang, wie es geplant ist, zu-
stande kommen wird.” 
69   Naturally, again the binomial sign test clearly rejects the hypothesis that positive and negative coefficients 
are the same in number. 
70   Re-estimating the event study of the second revision with event windows covering three, eleven, 15, 21, and 
31 days we also identified one peak in abnormal performance. In all five cases, it is situated in the same time 
period that is suggested by the results of the seven-day specification. In every alternative specification, the 
average value of the γi-coefficients are always smaller than in the original specification. 27 
the focus of our investigation is on the performance effect of the RWKS, we are mostly inter-
ested in the coefficients of the dummy variable that models membership in the RWKS. It is in-
significant in both the RoA equation and the q equation (see Table 3). All coefficients of the in-
teraction terms are insignificant as well. These results suggest that the RWKS did not affect the 
performance of its members in any way. 
Table 3: Regression Results I 
 
Dependent variable  RoA q ratio
Dependent variable (-1)  0.702 (0.000) 0.707 (0.000)
 
LEVERAGE  -0.027 (0.066) -0.493 (0.000)
SIZE  -0.003 (0.336) -0.051 (0.049)
GROWTH  0.000 (0.951) 0.013 (0.818)
 
RWKS  -0.017 (0.725) -0.223 (0.335)
 
RWKS*LEVERAGE  0.003 (0.872) -0.031 (0.825)
RWKS*SIZE  0.001 (0.679) 0.016 (0.248)
RWKS*GROWTH  0.009 (0.346) 0.096 (0.169)
 
 
LM  5.293 (0.259) 3.488 (0.480)
Adj. R
2  0.879 0.927
F-Test  74.691 (0.000) 131.716 (0.000)
Cross-sections  33 33
Obs.  724 724
Note: estimated with panel corrected standard errors (Beck/Katz, 1995); p-values in parentheses; LM = χ
2 test statis-
tic of Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation of residuals with 4 lags. 
 
For the control variables, the results obtained using the two different estimation methods are very 
similar, although there are differences in significance levels. First, the dynamic specification of 
the regression model seems well justified. In both equations, the coefficient of the lagged de-
pendent variable is significantly different from zero. Thus, in line with our theoretical reasoning, 
current performance was influenced by past performance. Second, the coefficient of LEVER-
AGE is negative and significant in both cases (at the 10 percent level in the RoA equation and at 
the 1 percent level in the q equation). This supports the conclusion that a high ratio of debt to 
total assets was a hindrance to profitable investment rather than an effective disciplining device 
for managers. Third, the coefficient of SIZE is also negative in both equations, but only signifi-
cant in the one with the q ratio as the dependent variable. Hence, there is weak evidence for 
negative returns to scale.
71 Finally, the coefficient of GROWTH is insignificant in both equa-
tions.
72 
The results of the event studies indicate that a positive performance effect of the RWKS should 
especially be expected in the valid time of the third contract, i.e., in the years 1904 to 1913. In 
order to test this proposition, we add another dummy variable (and the respective interaction 
                                        
71   This finding is line with estimates of a production function for the mining industry in the Ruhr for the years 
1881 to 1913 (Burhop/Lübbers, forthcoming). 
72   The insignificance of the GROWTH coefficients is likely due to the fact that the variable does not distinguish 
between profitable and non-profitable growth opportunities. While the former should have a positive effect 
on performance, the effect of the latter should be negative. However, a proxy that could make this crucial dis-
tinction was not available to us. 28 
terms) to equations (5) and (6). It is equal to one for all cartel members in the years 1904 to 1913 
and equal to zero otherwise. The exercise does not show a significant difference between cartel 
members’ performance in the years before and after 1903 (see Table 4). Thus, in this respect the 
findings of the dynamic panel data analysis do not confirm those of the event studies. 
 
Table 4: Regression Results II 
 
Dependent variable  RoA q ratio
Dependent variable (-1)  0.698 (0.000) 0.709 (0.000)
 
LEVERAGE  -0.028 (0.055) -0.483 (0.000)
SIZE  -0.003 (0.393) -0.053 (0.048)
GROWTH  0.001 (0.934) 0.012 (0.837)
 
RWKS  -0.039 (0.410) -0.255 (0.347)
RWKS (1904–1913)  0.039 (0.249) -0.024 (0.921)
 
RWKS*LEVERAGE  0.008 (0.740) -0.076 (0.665)
RWKS*SIZE  0.002 (0.367) 0.019 (0.263)
RWKS*GROWTH  -0.001 (0.965) 0.137 (0.202)
RWKS (1904–1913)*LEVERAGE  -0.006 (0.832) 0.083 (0.670)
RWKS (1904–1913)*SIZE  -0.002 (0.193) -0.002 (0.904)
RWKS (1904–1913)*GROWTH  0.012 (0.328) -0.050 (0.629)
 
 
LM  5.510 (0.239) 6.416 (0.170)
Adj. R
2  0.878 0.927
F-Test  70.502 (0.000) 124.153 (0.000)
Cross-sections  33 33
Obs.  724 724
Note: estimated with panel corrected standard errors (Beck/Katz, 1995); p-values in parentheses; LM = χ
2 test statis-
tic of Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelation of residuals with 4 lags. 
 
Based on the findings of the event studies and those of the dynamic panel data analysis, we can 
not argue compellingly for a positive performance effect of the RWKS. However, there is also 
no hint that the cartel effected its members’ profitability negatively. In combination with the evi-
dence for a significant reduction in the variability of coal prices, this implies that the RWKS sta-
bilised prices and was able and willing to do so at least slightly above the mean preserving level. 
Thus, scenario (1) (mean preserving price stabilisation) must be rejected, and scenario (2) (price 
stabilisation above the mean preserving level) remains as the only one that seems plausible. 
7.   Conclusion 
With regard to the performance effects of cartels in general and price stabilisation cartels in par-
ticular, economic theory provides no clear-cut predictions. Thus, the fundamental question 
whether cartels are able to raise the profits of their members has to be answered by empirical 
investigations. The existing studies do not offer consistent results as well. While some of them 
find a positive performance effect of cartelisation, others argue for negative repercussions or dis-
cover no effect at all. In our study we contributed to the empirical literature by providing an in-29 
depth case study of the RWKS, one of the longest-lasting and supposedly most powerful cartels 
ever. In order to assess the performance effects of this organisation, we made use of the informa-
tion content of stock prices and event study methodology to investigate the market reactions to 
its foundation and to the most important revisions made to the original cartel contract. Further-
more, we cross-checked the validity of the findings from the event studies by a dynamic panel 
data analysis of accounting, financial, and output data. 
Based on our empirical findings, we cannot argue compellingly for either a positive or a negative 
performance effect of the RWKS. In line with earlier results of Bittner (2005), the event studies 
showed that contemporary investors expected neither the formation of the cartel nor the first re-
vision of the original cartel contract to be performance enhancing. In the case of the second revi-
sion, we detected a positive effect, but its magnitude turned out to be far from impressive. The 
results from the combined analysis of accounting, financial, and output figures indicated neither 
a positive nor a negative effect of cartelisation on company performance – regardless of whether 
it is measured by the RoA or by Tobin’s q. 
Nonetheless, it would be premature to argue that the RWKS was ineffective throughout. A com-
parison of the variance of coal prices in cartel- and pre-cartel years suggested that the organisa-
tion was able to stabilise prices. Economic theory predicts that if it had done so at the mean pre-
serving level, stabilisation should have been accompanied by a negative performance effect. The 
fact that none of our empirical findings supports this theoretical prediction indicates that the 
RWKS was at least able and willing to exert enough market power to raise prices far enough 
about the mean preserving level to offset the negative repercussions of stabilised prices.
73 Such a 
conduct would resemble the officially stated aims of the RWKS quite closely. However, it is also 
possible that the cartel intended to fetch higher monopoly rents but was simply not powerful 
enough to achieve this aim. Arguing for either of these alternatives would be highly speculative. 
                                        
73   Although it is beyond the scope of our study, it should also be noted that price stabilisation is likely to be 
correlated with lower profit risk. For a risk-averse actor, such a reduction constitutes a valuable development 
in itself. 30 
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Number of OLS, ARCH, and GARCH Equations in Event Studies 
 
  Original Contract  First Revision  Second Revison 
OLS  2 1 0 
ARCH (1)  16 8 10 





Appendix Table 2: Sample of Companies 
 
No.  Company  RWKS  Years  ES 1  ES 2  ES 3 
1  Aplerbecker Aktien-Verein für Bergbau  1893  1882–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
2  Arenbergsche AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb  1893  1881–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
3  Bochumer Bergwerks-AG  1893  1881–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4  Bochumer Verein  1904  1881–1913  No  No  No 
5  Bonifacius 1893  1881–1898  Yes  Yes  No 
6  Concordia 1893  1891–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
7  Consolidation 1893  1890–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
8  Courl 1893  1891–1898  Yes  Yes  No 
9  Dannebaum 1893  1890–1899  Yes  Yes  No 
10  Deutsch-Luxemburg. Bergwerks- und Hütten-AG  1904  1903–1913  No  No  No 
11  Dortmunder Bergbau-AG  1893  1881–1893  No  No  No 
12  Eschweiler Bergwerks-Verein  Outsider  1881–1911  No  No  No 
13  Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks-AG  1893  1881–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
14  Georgs-Marien-Bergwerks- und Hüttenverein 1904  1881–1913  No  No  No 
15  Harperner Bergbau-AG  1893  1881–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
16  Hibernia 1893  1881–1904  Yes  Yes  Yes 
17  Hörder Bergwerks- und Hüttenverein  1904  1881–1906  No  No  No 
18  Hoesch 1904  1902–1913  No  No  No 
19  Hugo 1893  1881–1894  Yes  No  No 
20  Kattowitzer AG für Bergbau und Hüttenbetrieb  Outsider  1890–1912  No  No  No 
21  Kölner Bergwerks-Verein*  1893  1881–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
22  König Wilhelm  1893  1881–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
23  Louise Tiefbau  1893  1881–1907  Yes  Yes  Yes 
24  Magdeburger Bergwerks-AG  1893  1881–1913  No  No  No 
25  Massen 1893  1891–1910  Yes  Yes  Yes 
26  Nordstern 1893  1890–1906  Yes  Yes  Yes 
27  Phönix 1904  1897–1913  No  No  No 
28  Pluto 1893  1881–1898  Yes  Yes  No 
29  Rheinische Anthracit-Kohlenwerke**  1893  1890–1913  Yes  Yes  Yes 
30  Rheinische Stahlwerke  1904  1901–1913  No  No  No 
31  Schalker Gruben- und Hütten-Verein  1904  1900–1904  No  No  No 
32  Schles. AG für Bergbau und Zinkhüttenbetrieb  Outsider  1881–1912  No  No  No 
33  Union 1904  1881–1910  No  No  No 
Note: Years = years in panel; RWKS = beginning of membership in the RWKS; ES 1 =event study original contract; 
ES 2 =event study second contract; ES 3 =event study third contract; *since 1911 Köln-Neuessener Bergwerks-














































































Note: Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients; p-values of t-test in parentheses; leverage = book value of debt di-
vided by the book value of total assets at the end of 1892, 1894, and 1903, respectively; size = book value of 
total assets at the end of 1892, 1894, and 1903, respectively; growth = first difference of the natural logarithms 
of coal output in 1892 and 1891, 1894 and 1893, and 1903 and 1902, respectively; quota growth = growth of 
cartel quota during the valid time of the original contract and the first revision of the original contract, respec-
tively; quota growth (new shafts) / quota growth = share of quota increases due to new shafts in total quota 
growth during the valid time of the original contract and the first revision of the original contract, respectively; 
transitory clause = listing in the transitory provisions of the first revision of the original contract. 
Source: Jahrbuch (1894, 1897, 1904); Mining Archive, Bochum, inventory 33, no. 423: Annual Participation Figures; 
Saling’s Börsen Jahrbuch (1893, 1895, 1904); Verein (1904b). 
 